Max Mckeown

Always (Another) Way To Win

If you are getting whipped playing by the existing rules, get used to losing or change the game. If you can’t win by standing and fighting then run and hide. If you can’t win by being big, be small. If you can’t win by being small, be big. The first rule of winning is that there is no one way to win.

The Ancient Greek poets described the monstrous Hydra with more heads than the vase-painters could paint. Worse, for attackers, for each head cut off, the Hydra grew back two more. 

The Hydra was eventually defeated by Hercules with the help of his nephew, Iolaus, who stopped the new heads growing by holding a torch to the headless tendons of the neck. It then became simpler to work his way through each of the mortal heads until, with a mighty swing he decapitated the final, immortal head. 

This mythical encounter illustrates an ongoing struggle between different approaches to the art of winning. The Hydra seeks to replace heads quicker than they can be destroyed. It attempts to defends it’s center at the cost of temporary damage while defeating it’s enemy by moving rapidly and powerfully. Instead of one giant head, it has nine. Instead of heavy defenses, the Hydra substitutes speed. 

Any attacker would be initially confused because the behaviour is so unexpected and works against the strength of the attack. Any seeming success increases the strength of the enemy. It is a strategic adaptation that weakens the side expending the most effort. Physical resources are wasted with every attack while mental reserves are depleted with every renewal.

An example of this hydra problem faced the US strategy, or military doctrine, known as “shock and awe”. It was formally introduced to the lexicon in 1996 by the National Defense University. It’s authors, Harlan Ullman and James Wade were generous in their praise for both the US military and their ability to achieve rapid dominance:

“It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are currently the most capable in the world and are likely to remain so for a long time to come […] We seek to determine whether and how Shock and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling factors to force or convince an adversary to accept our will […] Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tactical,strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist.”

Shock and Awe became more widely known by the public during the 2003 invasion of Iraq when used to by US officials to describe their overarching strategy. The idea was that dropping enough precision bombs would destroy the chain of command and demoralize Iraqi forces, who would then surrender. In turn, ground forces would be warmly welcomed by Iraq citizens who would form a stable, USA loving democracy. 

On Friday 21st March 2003, the main attack began. Over 1700 bombing missions were carried out with over 500 using cruise missiles. Two weeks later ground forces seized Baghdad. Three weeks later the US declared victory. And on 1 May, President George W. Bush landed a jet onto an aircraft carrier and, under a giant banner, declared “mission accomplished”.

At first. to some, it seemed shock and awe had worked. The Washington Post published an interview, April 27, with Iraqi soldiers who said they stopped resisting because “it wasn’t a war, it was suicide”. Yet, in truth, resistance had not stopped, it had simply adapted to the impossibility of winning the war by US rules.

Play your winning game is an important adaptability principle. Adapting to win is more than simply coping. You may choose to minimize losses or save face but only as part of a winning adaptation. Surviving becomes one of several moves towards a winning position rather than the game itself.

Over 375,000 soldiers became unemployed on May 23, following Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 issued by U.S. Administrator of Iraq Paul Bremer. It was assumed there would be little violent resistance so that a new army of 40,000 new soldiers, trained by US corporations could replace them - in time. 

The traditional stand-and-fight army melted away and became something else, something better adapted to the situation. The insurgency - as it was labelled in the west - was a combination of armed Iraqi citizens, foreign fighters, and members of the newly disbanded Iraqi army.

Even worse, action and inaction encouraged the recruitment of new fighters. Actions included deaths of Iraqis as a result of the invasion with estimates ranging from 150,000 to around 600,000, as well as abuses such as those at the Abu Ghraib prison. 

Even if it is the lower of the two estimates for a country of 30 million people such a loss did little to inspire support or warmth. Inaction included the damage to infrastructure and institutions that left people unable to build lives or livelihoods.

The following is an illustration from three years after the invasion of the frustration that provides the background to resistance. 

“Irritation grows as residents deprived of air-conditioning and running water three years after the US-led invasion watch the massive US Embassy they call “George W’s palace” rising from the banks of the Tigris. The diplomatic outpost will be visible from space and cover an area that is larger than the Vatican city and big enough to accommodate four Millennium Domes.”

Forces of violent resistance were supported by a majority of Iraqis who wanted to be rid of what was seen as an occupying, colonial army. This level of public support further multiplies the motivation of individuals involved in the resistance and increases their effectiveness in resistance.

There were 139 American Deaths from the invasion starting to President Bush declaring ‘Mission Accomplished’ and more than 4335 since that date. The point is not that Iraqi resistance has defeated the US army. The point is that despite huge numbers of Iraqi deaths and over $800 billion spent on the War, the US army has not found a strategy to disarm or defeat the Iraqi resistance.

Multiply to Overcome If the other side of a strategic game decides to disperse, fragment, and divide to multiply then it becomes harder to defeat. It’s a form of swarming. And in practical terms final victory is denied as long as even one invisible, hard-to-find, motivated player continues to play. 

The adaptation of strategy of resistance to US forces was very rapid as the disappearance of the official Iraqi army. In contrast, adaptation of the US strategy was excruciatingly, dangerously slow.

The guiding assumptions of the US strategy in Iraq were wrong and this was noticed almost immediately. Yet the US strategy, and accompanying military response, remained stupidly slow. It was clear to some inside and outside US chain of command that the approach needed to change quickly but it did not. Understanding how the adaptive response was delayed provides valuable insights into what slows down or speed up adaptability. 

One argument put forward is that the USA had to learn how to deal with a new set of problems. The army had to learn on the ground, while being attacked, what it could not learn before it invaded. They had to learn from experimentation what eventually, through repeated trial and error, was a workable strategic adaptation. 

As Tim Harford argues, in his excellent book Adapt:

“Strategic errors are common in war. This wasn’t just about going into Iraq with the wrong strategy. It was a failure - worse, a refusal - to adapt.”

If we want to understand more about adaptability, we want to understand why what was already known was not used more rapidly. We want to know why what was learned was not put into practice. What was delaying the kind of adaptability that would have helped? Why did they refuse to adapt? And what does that tell us about the art of winning?

The US military had already experienced the limitations of decisive force and the unwinnable nature of guerrilla style resistance. Vietnam provided warnings. Those warnings had been documented, they had been made into movies, they were part of the American cultural heritage.

Likewise, the experience of the USSR in Afghanistan was a bloody case study of resistance and humiliating, costly defeat. The USA was the foreign power who helped, they should have known the potential for failure. It’s CIA had provided guidance and training, while it’s government had seen the deadly effectiveness of small groups of motivated, invisible resistance.

It is true that every situation is different in some way. It is true that even where a situation is similar the people are different and have to learn for themselves the practicalities of lessons already learned. But it is also true that even after the ground experience showed them what didn’t work that deficiencies stopped them being open to what might work.

Estimated Time to Adapt is the gap between the situation changing and an organization adapting to those changes. Sometimes it is a threat to the way things are that demands corresponding strategic adaptability. Other times, changes present new opportunities that require adaptation before they can be grasped. In both cases, changes must be recognized, nature of change understood, and the changes made in time to engineer a winning scenario.

Time to adapt can be slowed at any stage of necessary learning and action based on new understanding. This delay can be based either on ignorance of the facts, or of what the facts mean. It may also be based on a form of self-interest which ignores what is happening in order to accrue some other benefit. It is entirely possible for self-interest to lead to ignorance and for ignorance to lead to self-interest.

Individuals suffer from ignorance or self-interest which may negatively impact their organizations. Organizations also experience collective denial.  Individuals know what is really happening yet are unable to speak the truth clearly or powerfully enough to bring the organization to change it’s chosen strategy or actions. 

This disconnection, or gap, between what is happening and what prompts the organization to adapt creates a reality distortion field that slows any attempt at action. If you can’t see the problem you can’t respond to the problem. If you can’t mention the problem, you can’t discuss the problem. And while you’re failing to adapt, for reasons of tradition, ignorance or self-interest, your opponents adaptation whether in war, business, or politics, will continue to succeed. 

This is a draft excerpt from Adaptability: The Art of Winning by Max Mckeown

References

1. Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock And Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (National Defense University, 1996), XXIV.
2. Blakesley, Paul J. “Shock and Awe: A Widely Misunderstood Effect”. United States Army Command and General Staff College, June 17, 2004.
3. A Brief, Bitter War for Iraq’s Military Officers; Self-Deception a Factor in Defeat  William Branigin; The Washington Post; Apr 27, 2003
4. In the chaos of Iraq, one project is on target: a giant US embassy, Daniel McGrory, The Times, May 3, 2006
5. Various sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War
6. Pfizer’s Future: A Niche Blockbuster,  Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Wall Street Journal, 30 August, 2011

Copyright (c) by Max Mckeown 2011
The Author asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work.